We use a sample of 167 mergers during the period 1990-2002 involving 544 firms either as merging firms or competitors. We contrast a measure of the merger's profitability based on event studies with one based on accounting data. We find positive and significant correlations between them when using a long window around the announcement date.
Introduction
The assessment of the competitive effects of large mergers is one of the most important tasks for antitrust authorities worldwide. Unfortunately, these effects are not observed at the time when the authority must make its decision to allow or block the merger or let the merger through with remedies.
In principle, stock markets could help predicting the future profitability, since they are forward looking. However, many economists, in particular industrial organization economists, are skeptical about the markets' ability to correctly anticipate mergers' competitive effects. Thus, the pioneering efforts of Eckbo (1983) have not been widely applied in merger analysis. This paper tries to close the gap between the finance and industrial organization literatures by estimating (1) (ex ante) announcement effects of mergers on both merging and rival firms, (2) (ex post) balance sheet profit effects of these mergers on merging and rival firms up to five years postmergers, and (3) comparing these estimates by correlation analysis.
Measuring Profitability

Event Studies
Under the assumptions of efficient markets and rational expectations, the market model predicts that firm i's stock return at time t ( it R ) is proportional to a market return ( 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over an event window (m,n) is then defined to be: . We calculate these measures for each of the merging rival firms. 
Ex-post Profitability
We use the methodology of Gugler et al. (2003) to predict the merger's ex post profit effects. The method compares reported profit levels post merger with predicted profit levels in the absence of the merger. Our counterfactual is the development of profits and total assets of the median firm (in terms of profitability) in the same 3-digit industry as the merging firms or their rivals operate. We used a number of other counterfactuals, such as similar size or geographical regions but none changed our results significantly.
The projected change in the returns on the acquirer's assets from year t-1 to t+n are defined as:
, where Π IGt+n are the median firm's (income statement) profits and K IDt+n are the median firm's assets both in the same 3-digit industry of the acquired company in year t+n.
We define ∆ ID t,t+n for the acquired firm's industry analogously to ∆ IG t-1,t+n . The predicted profits of the combined company M in year t+n is then:
where Π Gt+n (Π Dt ) are the profits and K Gt+n (K Dt ) are the assets of the acquiring (acquired) company in year t+n (t).
The same logic can be applied to the rivals. In fact, antitrust markets are different than industries based on the SIC classification. The advantage of our database is that we have information on the merging firms' effective rivals in the involved product markets. These firms are not a good counterfactual, since they are influenced by the merger just as much as the merging firms are.
However, the merger should not strongly affect the rest of the industry, which makes the 3-digit SIC classification a good counterfactual for the merger, once we exclude the merging and rivals firms. We can, hence, get a measure of the projected change in the returns and of the predicted profit for the rivals in absence of the merger, which is something novel in the literature.
Our measure of firm i's merger effect (i=merging entity or rivals) is then the difference between actual (observed) profits in year t+n and the predicted profits:
The Data and Correlations
Our sample consists of 167 concentrations that were analyzed by the European Commission (EC) during the period 1990-2002. 2 We identify 544 different firms either as merging or as rival firms. The relevant markets and, thus, rivals are defined in the EC reports. Table 3 splits the sample into pro and anticompetitive mergers. 3 Interestingly, the market correctly anticipates anti-competitive mergers when using long pre-announcement periods (25 to 50 days), as witnessed by the large and significant correlation coefficients for rivals up to five years post merger. Also, the market predicts merging firms' rents stemming from increased efficiencies (procompetitive mergers) more precisely than those stemming from an increase in market power (anticompetitive mergers).
Conclusions
This paper establishes empirical evidence that the event study methodology is useful for the competitive analysis of mergers. In particular, for a large sample of EU mergers during the period 1990-2002, we show that abnormal returns and ex post profitability of mergers are positively and significantly correlated. This is particularly true when using long event windows and, for rivals, in anti-competitive mergers. Notes: We report pairwise correlation coefficients (first row) as well as p-values (second row).***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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